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Abstract
How large are potential benefits from global risksharing? In order to answer this ques
tion we propose a new methodology that is closely connected with the empirical growth
literature. We obtain estimates of residual risk (growth uncertainty) at various horizons
from regressions of country-specific growth in deviation from, world growth on a wide
set of vari.ables in the information set. Since this residual risk can be entirely hedged
through ri-sksharing, we use it to obtain a measure of the potential welfare gain' for' a
representative country. We find that nations can reap very large benefits from, engaging
in such risksharing arrangements. Usingpost-war data, the gain for a 35-year horizon,
corresponding to an equivalent permanent increase in consumption, is 6.6% when based
on a set of 49 countries, and 1.5% when based on 21 OECD countri.es. Using historical
data from. 1870 to 1990, we find that the potential gain for a 120-year hori.zon ranges
from. 4-9% for a small set of ri.ch countri.es to 16.5% for a broad set of 24 countri.es.
1 Introduction.
How rich will the Russians be compared to the British in twenty, thirty or fifty years?
Will India still be poor relative to the rest of the world in one century, and will the
US still be the leader? There are many, stunning examples in history of countries which
were once rich but are now poor, and vice versa. Although one can attempt to make
predictions about growth, there will remain significant uncertainty about relative growth
rates a,t long horizons. We show empiric^ly that oyer a period of 35 years one country's
per capita GDP can, purely by chance,_easily, double relative to that of another. The
growth hterature so far^is primarily concerned with explaining these differences in long
tenn ^owth rates, but has paid little attention to long term growth uncertainty. } Our
goal in this paper is to measure grp^h uncertainty at various horizons and compute the
welfare gain from-sharing this macroeconomic, risk among nations.;
In international macroeconomics a.large.hterature has developed in recent years
evaluating the gains from risksharing among countries. This interest stems from two-
sources. First, risksharing associated with intratemporal asset trade is one of the three
. ' * 'I^key roles of international financial markets. The other two are consumption smoothing
through intertemporal asset trade and allocating resources to their-most productive uses.
The benchmark model in international.macroeconomics is one of complete markets,
where all three roles are performed perfec,tly (e.g. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)).
Second, the evidence indicates that the real world is far removed from the per
fect risksharing paradigm that is the centerpiece of our models. The perfect riskshar
ing hypothesis is generally rejected in formal regression-based tests (Canova and Ravn
1994],Lewis [1996] and Obstfeld [1994c]j. 4. problem with perfect-risksharing\
models is that the imphed correlation of consumption across countries is much-larger'-
than the income correlation, while the opposite is observed in the data. 'Backus, Ke
hoe and Kydland [1992] have coined this 'the '"quantity anomaly". Direct evidence on
international portfolio diversification, e.g. by French and Poterba [1991] and Tesar and
Werner [1994], shows that there is a strong-home bias in equity portfolios. Trade in
claims on a broad measure of national output's-currently does not even exist. Shiller
1993] has made a strong case for the introduction of such'markets. ^
t t • '
All exception is Easterly, et.al. [1993], wlio (conclude that "much variation in growth rates is due to
random shocks' . They find that the low persistence ofdecade average growth rates is associated with
random shocks since "country-diaracteristics" arc highly persistent.
Shiller and Athanasoulis [1995] and Athanasoulis'[1996] show how such markets may be constructed.
A lack of risksharing among nations is no surprise if the potential welfare payoff is
small. Results reported in the literature vary enormously, ranging from less than 0.1%
(welfare equivalent permanent increase in expected consumption) to over 100%. This
has led to considerable confusion concerning the true magnitude of these gains. ^
van Wincoop [1994, 1996b] shows that the welfare gain from risksharing depends
on four factors (i) the risk-free interest rate, (ii) the risk-adjusted growth rate, (iii)
the rate of relative risk-aversion, and (iv) uncertainty about the endowment. The first
two are relatively easy to measure.® After choosing a consensus estimate for the rate of
relative risk-aversion, the main obstacle that remains is measuring endowment uncer
tainty. ®The approach that is taken throughout the literatiure is to estimate a specific
process for the endowment. The problem with this is that the results are very sensitive
to both the type of process assumed and the parameters of a specific process. As an
example, van Wincoop [1996b] considers different endowment processes for a set of 21
OECD countries, setting the rate of relative risk-aversion at three. The welfare gain for
a representative country at a lOO-year horizon is 5.6% when the endowment is assumed
to follow an AR in growth rates, 0.2%when a global cointegration term is added to the
AR in growth rates, and 0.1% when the process is stationary (approximately an AR(1)
with a deterministic trend).
Rather than assuming a particular endowment process, here we adopt an alternative
approach whereby we only make assumptions about the information set used to predict
future growth. Since only uncertainty about deviations from world growth matters for
van Wincoop {1996b| for a discussion ofthis literature andexplanations for the widely diverging
welfare gain measures. Recent papers that have computed welfare gains from risksharing across countries
include Athanaaoulis [1996], Backus. Kchoe'and Kydland [1992], Cole and Obstfeld [199r]7Kbse [1995],
LcwiH [199t)a], Mendoza [1994,1995], Obstfeld [1994a,b,1995], Shiller and AthanasouUs [1995], Tes'ar
[1995] and van Wincoop [1994, 199tia,b].
''van Wincoop [1994] shows that, given these four factors, the welfare gain does not depend on the
typo of preferences. Three different types arc considered: standard von Neuinan Morgenstern expected
utility, non-expected utility (Kreps-Porteus preferences), and habit formation preferences.
^Preferences are often parameterized in the literature in a way that implies excessively high risk-free
interest rates, wliich reduces the welfare gain measure. For example, the implicit risk-free rate in Cole
and Obstfeld (1991) ranges from 5.0% to 50%.
®Most of this literature assumes endowment economies rather than production economies since it
is concerned with the risksharing role of international capital markets and not the optimal resource
allocation role.
^The low welfare gain for a stationary process is consistent with the finding by Lucas [1987] that the
cost of aggregate business cycle fluctuations is negligible. At long horizons business cycle uncertainty
should be overshadowed by long term growth uncertainty.
risksharing, for a given horizon we regress, deviations from world growth on variables in
the information set. This provides us with a measure of growth uncertainty at various
horizons, which we use to compute the gain from international risl^haring.
This approach has three advantages. First, we don't need to specify an eritire model
or data generating process. We use much less information since different processes (many
quite compUcated) can be consistent with the same information set used to predict future
growth. Choosing the wrong process, even if it is consistent with the correct information
set, can lead to highly misleading results. Second, even if one knows what type of
process the endowment follows, it is not advisable to estimate it with annual data and
then use this to determine growth uncertainty at loiig horizons. Imprecision in estimated
parameters, e.g. due to small samples or multi-collinearity,' lead to imprecise predictions
that are amplified significantly when making projections far enough into the future.
Finally; and most importantly, we find that the results "are robust to the size of the
information set. After including the "three most important variables, expanding the
information set with a large set of additionalvariables does not improve the explanatory
power. ® •
The remainder of the paper is" organized as follows. The next section describes how
a measure of welfare gains for a representative country is, obtained'based on uncertainty
about deviations from world growth at various horizons. Section 3 describes the data
and the empirical implementation method of the welfare gain measure. Most of the
analysis is based on post-World War II data for a set' of 49 countries and a smaller set
of 21 OECD countries. We also use an historical data set starting in 1870 in order to
compute welfare gains over very long horizons! We rely heavily on the empirical growth
literature in choosing a wide rsinge of 21 possible variables in the information.set..The
findings ase. discussed in section 4. Conclusions and directions for future research are
contained in the final section.
®For example, an AR(1) in A/n y {y=pvr capita ondowiiioiit). and the same process with a global
cointogration term {In y —In y" ) added! lead tu the same information 'set to predict the deviation
from world growth: the current and one period lagged Iwy - In y^ '^, where y"' is the world per capita
endowment., But, as discussed above, these processes hayc. totally different welfare implications;.
®Whilc in the empirical growth hterature addiiional right hand side variables are significant, this-
should be no surprise since these are usually con (e.mporaneous variables. Instead, we use variables that
are in the hiformation set at the time predictions about growth are made. For example, it should be no
surprise that ex^post knowledge of significant political instability (revolutions and coups) reduces the
ex-post prediction of growth. But, especially for a long horizon, knowledge about political instability
in the past will have much less predictive power for future growth.
2 A Measure of Welfare Gains
Assume there are N countries. Letting 7 denote the constant rate of relative risk aver
sion, expected utility of a representative agent of country i is
y=£oi: (1)
f=i ^ 7
where Eq denotes the expectation at time zero. "
We assume an endowment economy, where yu is the per capita country i endowment
at time t. The per capita world endowment is where nu is the popu
lation in country i and Ut is the world population. Before risksharing cn = yit. Next we
allow for trade in claims on the endowments. As is shown in vanWincoop [1994], for
a specific country the welfare gain from risksharing depends both on the reduction in
risk and the price of a claim on its endowment stream relative to that of a claim on the
world endowment stream. Relative prices of endowment claims depend on the expected
levels of endowments as well as the stochastic properties of the endowments. However,,
if one for example has thirty years of data, using our approach it is hard to identify the
endowment uncertainty of individual countries over a thirty year horizon. There is only
one observation per country. We will therefore avoid the pricing problem by focusing
on the welfare gain of a 'representative' country, called rep. For this country it is
assumed that (i) the price of a claim on its per capita endowment stream relative to
that of a claim on the per capita world endowment stream is one, and (ii) the variance
of the innovation of endowment growthminus world endowment growth (defined below)
is equal to the average over all countries. The first assumption imphes that Crep,t —y^
after risksharing.
We impose two conditions which ensure that the relative price of a claim on the
representative country's per capita endowment stream is one. First, at all horizons rep's
expected per capita endowment is equal to the expected per capita world endowment:
•Co Vrep.! = Eo y^' {t.= 0,.., T"). This assumption has the additional advantage that there
are no gains from intertemporal asset trade (consumption smoothing), so that we can
a.ssuino that all goods arc tradablo. Optimal risksharing arraiigcmeiits in the presence of non-
traded goods have been analyzed by Lewis [199Gb], Tcsar[1993, 1995) and van Wincoop [1996b]. van
Wincoop [1996b] shows that taking into account non-separability between traded and non-traded goods
in utility generally raises the potential welfare gain from risksharing.
^^This 'representative country' is an artificial construction, also used in vanWincoop [1996bj. It does
not actuallv have to exist.
focus exclusively on the risksharing role of'international financial markets. Second,
the coyariance between-the growth innovation of'rep with the^world growth inno\'ation
is the same as the variance of the world growth innovation. Using terminology usually
used in reference to asset returns one might say that 'the beta of country rep's growth
rate' is one. Appendix A shows-that these two conditions guarantee that the relative'
price of the claim on rep's endowment-stream, is indeed -one. -
The variables in the information set at time t used to predict future country i per
capita endowment level are denoted by the.vector Zii of z country specific variables, and
a vector Wt of w global variables. It is assumed that:
/ t
yi,t+s = Vit . . , . . (2)
where the innovation ei^t,t+s over the period [t,t+s] has a normal distribution with ex
pectation zero and variance The variance depends on the country and the horizon.
After taking logs, (2) impHes
~ . r ' '
2/i,(+s — yit = Kst + + Ci.f.t+s (3)
where Kst = Vs'^ t is constant across countries. Eqn. (3) is famihar from the empirical
growth literature if we interpret y as output.
Define 6i^t,t•^rs = ^^e expected country i endowment at ^+ 5 relative
to the expected world endowment. \jsing these weights tosubtract the global average
of variables in (3), we get;
yi,t+s ~ Vit ~ ^ yi,t+s T yit] = ' (4)
t=l
where Uix,t+s — ~ which subtracts the global growth innovation from the
country innovation. The global innovation is defined as hut+sUit-^s-
As discussed above, for the representative.country: cov{€rep,t,t+s -^rt-i^s^^l^t+s) = 0- It
says that the 'beta ofits growth rate', defined as isone. It follows that
We already excluded the resource allocation rolo of international capital .markets by assuming an
endowment economy. •/ . >.•
^^We abstract from uncertainty about future population.
"This holds by construction for a weighted average of countries, since' t 11+ —
var[uTep,t,t+s) = (^Tep,s ~ ^Wsi "where is the variance ofthe global growth innovation
As we will now show, it is this difference between the variance of country specific
and global growth innovation" that determines the gain from risksharing. Estimation of
eqn. .(4) in the next section provides us with an estimate of the average variance of
y'i^t,t+s across countries, which (according to (ii)) gives usi;ar(urep,t_t4.s).
From (2), in the absence of risksharingexpected utility of the representative country
is
Eq ^-0t(.yrep,ty ^^ ^-0t (-^0. ^
t=i 1 —7 1 —7
Here we used the assumption Eq yrep,t = ^oV^-
After risksharing
N
(5)
= vT = {E^ vY) E . (6)
t=l
In Appendix B it is shown, based on numerical simulations, that we can make the
following very precise approximation:
Ea [E Siflf "7(1 - 7) ~ (7)
2=1
£^0 - 7) = /(I - 7)
A similar approximation is also made in van Wincoop [1994] and Lewis [1996a]. Per
capita world output is a weighted average of log-normally distributed variables [yu),
which is not log-normally distributed itself. (7) amounts to assumingan approximate log-
normal distribution for per capita world output. Expected utility of the representative .
country after risksharing can then be approximated as
1-7 ti 1-7 (8)
From (5) and (8) we can derive an expression of the welfare gain for the represen
tative country. As is common in the welfare gains literature, the gain is computed as
the permanent percentage increase in expected consumption that generates an equal
Lewis [1996aj, in Appendix A, shows through Monte Carlo experiments that the log of world output
is arbitrary close to a normal distribution if output of individual countries is log-normally distributed.
After 4000 draws of a 22 year period for 7 countries, she cannot reject that the log of world output has
no skewness and the kurtosis is 3, as it should be under a normal distribution.
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improvement in'welfare, as obtained from international riskshaxing. The welfare gain for
the representative country is therefore:. > . - r ' '
]V(i-7) _i . , (9).
t=i , ,
The weights f2f are defined as
where yrep,t = ('^ o is the certainty equivalent of rep's endowment at time
t. ' ' • • •
The weights Qi can be simplified by introducing'the following notation. Let" be
the expected growth rate ofvthe world' per capita endowment over fO.tl: .
.VoThe certainty equivalent" of rep's growth rate is = '/^t - 0.57C7^gpf. From the Euler^
equation, tHe t period real interest rate on a ri^kfree'bond is rt = pt -i-'jp-f With this
notation,- • > • ^ ^
Ht = —5^ —r:^ . (11)
So the appropriate discount factor is the-difference between the'riskfree real interest rate
and the risk adjusted growth rate. ' ''•!• • . - 1
While we use (9)'to' compute the welfare gain for the representative country,' a some
what more intuitive expression, which numerically is very close to (9), can be obtained
using the-approximations 1 ^-'x-and (1^ 1ax for x close to zero. This
approximate welfare gain is '' ' . • : • • '
0.57 j, p-(r,-A.) ~ (^2)
^.= 1 '^S=\ ^
which is equal to therate'of relative risk aversion divided by two, times aweigted average
of the drop in the.variance of endowment growth:" whereby the weights depend oh the
difference between the riskfree rate and the'riskadjusted'growth rate at various horizons.^,
i I ' ' i k '
3 Empirical Implementation
In order to implement (9) to get an estimate of' the welfare gain' for a representative
country, we need to (i) select a set of countries and'sample period, (ii)'choose a measure
7 .
for the endowment ?/, (iii) choose a set ofvariables z in the information set, (iv) estimate
the regression (4) for horizons s = (v) choose an estimate for the riskfree real
interest rate and risk-adjusted growth rate at different horizons, and (vi) choose an
estimate for the rate of relative risk aversion. In this section we will describe how this
is done. The next section discusses the findings.
3.1 The Data
For now we limit our attention to post war data. Section 4.4 considers an extension to a
120 year sample of historical data. The main advantage of a post war sample is that far
more data are available, so that we can select a much broader set of variables z in the
information set. The disadvantage is that we have to limit ourselves to shorter horizons.
The two main data sets are the Penn World Table (Mark 5.6) and the Barro-Lee
1994] data set. The Penn World Table (PWT) has data for 152 countries from 1950
to 1992, although for most countries data are not available for this entire sample. The*
Barro-Lee (BL) data set covers 138 countries, at five year intervals over the period 1960
to 1985, although there are many missing data for individual countries. The remainder
of this section describes what information from these datasets is used.
In order to select variables to be included in the information set, the,empirical growth
literature provides a useful guideline. The problem however, as mentioned in Sala-i-.
Martin [1994], is that in this enormous literature over 50 variables have been found to
be correlated with growth in at least one regression. This should not be a surprise, since
there is significant multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. Nonetheless this
multi-collinearity problem is less of a concern to us than it is to those that attempt to
identify which variables affect growth. After all, we are only interested in the residual
variance, without being concerned which of the right hand side, variables really cause
growth.
Assuming that a representative agent is no 'smarter' than the collective of individuals
that have contributed to the empirical growth literature, we restrict our information set
to the main variables that have emerged from this research. For now our measure of the
endowment is per capita GDP, as in the growth literature, although other measures will
be considered in section 4.3. Variables in the information set refer to the year in which
predictions about future growth are made. In our 'base information set' we include the
^®Moreover, it is quite possible that one of the right hand side variables simply proxies for another,
non-observed, variable that truely causes growth.
log of initial per.capita GDP {log GDP); the. one year and 5 year lagged change in the
log of per capita GDP {Ailog GDP.and A^log GDF);' the'five year lagged population
growth rate (GPO); the ratio of private consumption to GDP (C/Y), the ratio of
investment to GDP {I/Y)', the government consumption to GDP ratio (G/Y); openness
as measured by exports plus imports, divided by GDI?, the gross, enroljment
ratios for primary, secondary and higher education {PRIE, SECE, HIGHE)\ the
fertility rate (FERT)^ and hfe expectancy at birth (LIFE). In sensitivity analysis
we consider a set of eighV' additional v^iables:' political instability measured as an
average of revolutions and iassassinatibns over the past five years (PINSTAB), terms
of trade growth over 'the p^t five "years (TOT), percentage of primary, secondary and
higher school attained {PRIA; SECA^HIGHA), one year^nd five'year lagged private
consumption ^owth (Aj'c, A5C)'anci the investment ratio [I/Y) averaged over the p^t
five years. The l^t five of the variables from the' 'base information set' and the first five
from the additional variables are from tHe BL data set; the others are from the PWT.
Since these variables have been eixtensively discussed in the growth literature we'refer
to Barro [1991], Barro and Lee'[1994], iSarro and Sala-i-M^tin [1995 "and Xevirie'and
Renelt'[1992] for justifications for including them in growth regressions.
We construct a sample'of'annual data from 1955 to 1990 for'a'set of 49 countries,
listed in Appendix C. The countries are chosen such that the PWT data are available
for each year of th&sample, and the BL' data (with the exception of PINSTAB and
TOT) for each of the five year intervals'froni' I960' to 1985. The education variables,
as well'as the' fertility rate'and life expectancy, change very gradually over time. In
order-to exploit the. annual data'^ available from'the PWT, we interpolate the BL data
in between observations at 1960,1965'. 1970. 1975, 1980 and 1985. ' Since one can:draw.
almost a straight line between these observations for most countries we believe very little
information is lost in doing so. Between 1955 and 1960, and between i985 and 1990, we
extrapolate, ^suming the same growth rate''as in the neighbouring 5 year interval.
For the two reniaiiiing BL variables, political instability arid terms oif trade growth,
interpolation and extrapolation are unwarranted. In order to evaluate the importance
of these variables, for the same^49 countries we consider a smaller sample from 1970 to-
1990 in the sensitivity analysis, using only data'at five year intervals.'
We also consider a smaller'set of 21 OECD countries, listed'in Appendix C. The
OECD countries.are ofparticular-interest since' their financial markets are well developed
^^Since this includes five year lagged growth rates ui 1955, the sample really starts in 1950.
and most barriers to international capital flows have been eliminated. It is the lack of
diversification among these countries that is one of the main puzzles in international
macroeconomics.
3.2 Estimation of the Growth Regression
Estimation of Eqn. (4) is different fi'om standard growth regressions in several ways.
First, only variables in the initial information set are used as right hand side variables.
In contrast, it is common in the empirical growth literature to use contemporaneous
variables. This leads to the well known causalityproblems, which our approach naturally
avoids. Second, we subtract global averages from both the right and left hand side of
Eqn. (3). In standard growth regressions (3) is estimated directly, with Kst (which
includes the global variables) replaced with a constant term. The problem there is
that the innovations €i^t,t+s positively correlated across coimtries, which is ignored
in the regressions. Since the innovations are not independent, Mankiw [1995] concludes
that statistical significance is overstated and reported standard errors associated with
parameter estimates cannot be reUedupon. Since we subtract global averages, it is much
more reasonable to assume that the innovationsUi^t,t+s uncorrelated across countries.
By construction this has to be correct on average.
A final difference is that the growth literature usually only considers one cross section,
while instead we use panel data to estimate Eqn. (4). We use all non-overlapping
intervals of a given horizon, starting with the most recent observation in the sample. .For
example, over the sample 1955-1990, the intervals for an 8 year horizon are 1982-1990;
1974-1982; 1966-1974; 1958-1966. By using non-overlapping intervals the innovations
should be uncorrelated across these observations. We can therefore estimate (4) for a
particular horizon with OLS since the innovations are assumed to be uncorrelated both
across time and across countries. A longer horizon imphes fewerobservations per country
and therefore less precision. For an horizon over 17 years there is only one observation,
so that we are back at the standard cross section.
A final issue that needs to be discussed is the measurement of ^1^4.0 = .
Since we don't know what the expectations are before estimating Eqn.(4), we follow the
following multi-step procedure. First we estimate Eqn.(4) with equal country weights in
order to obtain an estimate of This is used to obtain Oat+s = •
(2-.j=i^ot+syjte ^ 3^)
^®This is the sameas estimating (3) with OLS.
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We then re-estimate Eqn.(4), which yields a new estimate ofA^, and therefore Oi^t,i+s-
It turns out that after three iterations (three estimations of-Eqn. •{4))ithe 9's remain
practically unchanged. The results reported in the next section apply to the fourth
estimation of (4). i-.-' ' .il;
• ' ? f
3.3 Estimates of 7, rt and fit ' '
The purpose of the xegressions is to obtain for.each horizon an estiniate of the. average
variance of residual risk over all countries. Let^u be the stacked vector of residuals for
a given horizon. Denote by obs the total number of observations, which is equal to the
number of countries times the observations per country. The latter ranges from one for
horizons over 17 years to 35 for the one ye^ horizon. For horizon 5-we estimate the
average variance in the standard way as = {u'u)/{obs —z), where z is the number
of right hand side variables. If conditional on the variables in the information set,
the expected variance for a particular country is equal to the average variance over all
countries, is an unbiased estimate of the average variance.
In general this is not the case however. .As ^ illustration consider a single cross
country regression over an horizon s and an information set consisting.of one variable.
Define x = (.-ri,where x^ = Zi — Then it is easy to show that
N • y-N _2_2
.. (13)=
i=l
where crj is the expectedvariance ofthe countryi residual conditional on the information
set X. If for all countries this expected variance is independent of the information set,,
and equal to the country average then (13) becomes so that cr^ is an unbiased
estimate of cr^. However, if the variance_is different across countries (13) shows that
less weight is given to the variance of countries that are extreme in the sense that Zi is
much larger or smaller than the world average (so that xf is large). To the extent that
countries that are 'extreme' in the above sense ha.ve a larger expected variance , leads
^®Thc Gxact expression should be —r .3 . However, we don't have coun-"
try specific estimates of the Moreover, exccpt at very long horizons differences in the (7? '^s across
countries are unlikely to be large enough to have significant effect on the shares Oi.t.t+s-
-°The estimated residual is u = Au. where A = Ijv - Therefore B =
Eiu'A'An\T) E(u'An\x) B(Tr Anu'\x) TrlA E uu'\x) , . .
(A-1) ~ —(A/_i) ——{N-i) ~ —(AT-i)—^ where Tr is the tracc. We can write that out
as (13).
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to an underestimation of the average expected variance. The welfare.gains reported
below for a representative country should then be considered to be on the conservative
side.
Throughout the paper the rate of relative risk-aversion is assumed to be three. This
is the average of estimates in Friend and Blume [1975]. We consider it to be a good
consensus estimate overall. However, it is easy to obtain the welfare gain for any other
rate of relative risk-aversion. From (12) it follows that the welfare gain is approximately
proportional to 7. So the gain woiild be one third of what we'report if one believes in
log-utility; and three times of what we report if one believes the rate of risk-aversion is
nine.
The risk-adjusted growth rate is /2t = /it —0.57cr^. We find that the annuahzed risk
premium, 0.57a^/t, is somewhere between 0.001 (0.1%) and 0.005 (0.5%). A measure
for fit can be found by taking a simple average growth rate of per capita GDP over the
sample. The average annual growth rate from 1950 until 1990 is 2.1% for the 49 countries
and 3.0% for OECD countries. The latter is high by historical standards though. For
the historical data from 1870 until 1990, discussed in section 4.4, the average growth*
rate over all 24 countries in that sample is 1.7%. We set the risk-adjusted growth rate
at a constant 1.5% annually: /2f = 0.015t
A measure of the riskfree rate Vt is constructed as follows. Over the period 1889 to
1978 Mehra and Prescott [1985] find an average annual real rate of 0.8% on relatively
riskless three month US Treasury securities. In order to obtain an average term structure,
we use data from 1947until 1985 from McCulloch [1990] on the zero-coupon yield curve
for Treasury bonds, j is set equal to 0.008, plus the average difference between the t
year yield and the 3-month yield. Since only few observations are available at maturities
over 30 years, we assume the yield curve is fiat after that. For sensitivity analysis,
we will briefly consider'a 1% higher and lower annual riskfree rate {Art = ±0.0U).
-^For example, the poorest countries arc extrcino in that they have relatively low initial GDP. They
might have relatively large uncertainty bocauso thcnvis a large potential upward mobility. When lagged
growth is part of the information set it may be reasonable to argue that countries whose past growth
has deviated significantly from the world average are on average the more 'risky' ones.
^-In fact, the average yield curvc is almost flat after a ten year maturity.
12
4 Findings
4.1 Regression Results , ^
For three different horizons (1, 10 and 35 years) Tables 1 and 2 show'regression results
for all 49 countries and the 21 OECD' countries respectively. Results are reported for the
entire base information set as well as for a much smaller set of the three 'best' variables.
These are the ones that lead to the lowest welfkre gain at a 35 year horizon. As is
well known, growth is h^d to predict at very short horizons. For a one year horizon
the is 0.06 and 0.19 for the two sets of countries' respectively. But-it rises to 0.50
and 0.75 for the 35 year horizon. Parameter estimates associated with the entire base
information set are imprecise, especially at the 35 year horizon. The only parameter
that is si^ificant at all horizons is the log of initial per capita GDP. The imprecision is
a result of a high degree of collinearity. Moreover, at the 35 year horizon there is one
observation per'country, which iheans'that there are only'eight degrees of freedom left
for the 21 OECD countries. ' ' ' ' '
Parameter estimates are" quite precise at all horizons when the information set is
limited to the three "best" variables, for wHich'the 35 year welfare gain is smallest.
For the set of ^9 countries these are the log of initial per capita GDP, the fertility rate
and the investment rate. For the OECD countries the investment rate is replaced by
enrollment in higher education os the third most important variable.
The fertility rate was also found to be significant in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995 .
Brander'[1992] finds'that fertiUty declines'precede rather than lag higher growth rates.
One reason it may be important as a predictor of future growth is that it has very direct
and unambiguous implications for the fiitaire demographic structure of an economy-
But there must be more to the fertility rate than demographics alone since it is even
significant at the one' year horizon. The fertility rate turns out to be a good proxy for
a wide variety variables. The average cross country correlation (over all 35 years of
the sample) is 0:86 with population growth. -0.83 with the log of GDP, -0.90 with life
expectancy, -0.85 with enrollment in secondary education, anid -0.66 with the investment
rate.
At a theoretical level the important role of the'investment rate is not surprising. At
an empirical levelLevine and Renelt [1992] find the (contemporaneous) investment rate
to be the single most important variable in growth regressions,*with its significance being
robust to other variables added to the regression. They did not include fertihty in their
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study. It is not surprising that for the OECD countries em-ollment in higher education is
an even more important predictor of future growth. Gro\\th in industrialized countries
is obviously strongly associated with development of new technologies, which to a great
extent is a product of investment in higher education.
Tables 1 and 2 also report the standard deviation of the residual term. Even though
a significant part of growth is accounted for by variables in the information set. the
standard deviation of remaining risk is nonetheless quite large. At the 35 year horizon,
for the base information set, it is 0.33 for the 49 countries and 0.16 for the OECD
countries. This means that the width of a 95% confidence inter\'al for 35 year growth
relative to the world average is 1.29 (129%) for a representative country from the 49
countries, and 0.63 (63%) for a representative OECD country. Purely by chance, the
size of one country's per capita GDP relative to that of another could easily double
during this period.
Figures 1 and 2 show the standard deviation of residual risk as a function of all
horizons up to 35 years. In order to illustrate the predictive power of a few variables,
the results are also shown when (i) the information set is empty (all deviations from
'world' per capita GDP growth are considered a shock), (ii) only the log of initial
GDP is in the information set, (iii-iv) the information set consists of the two or three
variables leading to the lowest welfare gain at a 35 year horizon.
Consistent with the findings by Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995], for the larger group
ofcountries initial GDP by itselfdoes not have much predictive power (the convergence
coefficient has the wrong sign and is often insignificant), while for OECD countries there
is strong convergence. At a 35 year horizon the standard deviation of risidual risk for
OECD countries drops significantly from 0.33 to 0.22 when only the log of initial per
capita GDP enters the information set. Barro [1991] first found that even for a large
set of 98 countries there is strong evidence of conditional convergence, in that initial
GDP enters with a significantly negative sign once we control for some other variables.
Consistent with that. Table 1 shows that even for the larger set of 49 countries initial
GDP is strongly significant once we control for either two or twelve additional variables.
We can see from Figures 1 and 2 that almost all of the explanatory power comes
from tliree variables. At an horizon up to 18 years the estimated standard deviation is
practically identical when two. three or thirteen variables are included. Only for longer
-^Since in that case we have no inforrnaLioii set to form expectations concerning the weights $, these
weights are baiied on the expectation from the entire base information set. In all other cases the
corresponding information set is used to form expectations abont the weights.
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horizons does the third variable have some additional explanatory' power over the first
two variables. The Figures also show that while the estimated standard deviation rises
smoothly as a function of the horizon when only two or three variables are.included,
this curve becomes quite bumpy for the entire information set, particularly for OECD
countries. This results from the few degrees of freeddih remaining beyond a 17 j^ear
horizon for OECD countries. ' On average though, even for the long horizons, the
estimated standard deviation for OECD countries based on the entire information set is
approximately'the same as that for the three best variables.
For illustrative purposes Figure 3 shows pictures for both sets of countries of the
actual and predicted deviation from world growth from 1955 to 1990. The pictures' are
based on the best three variables in the information set. The advantage of showing the
pictures with three rather than 13 variables in the information set is that few degrees
of freedom are wasted, so that the variance in the pictures corresponds closely to the
estimated variance. It should be stressed that these pictur^are illustrative. Adding one
more variable can affect'the position of a particular country in the graph, even though
it hardly affects the overall estimate of the variance.
If we take Figure 3 seriously, the countries with the largest positive deviation from
expected growth are Japan and Canada. While the ^owth rate of japan is 100% above
the total OECD growth rate,'34% of that is unexpected. The Canadian growth rate
is only 5% less than the OECD average, but'wks expected to' be almost 38% less.
Some of the worst performers relative to expectation, with growth almost 20% belowthe
predicted level, are Greece, New Zealand and the UK. For the'larger set of 49 countries,
some of the best performers relative to expectation ^e Japan, Thailand and Mexico.
Notice that this does not include'a lot of the 'Asian' miracles', such as Hong.Kong;
Singapore. South Korea and Taiwan^ These' countries are not in the sample due to
incompleterdata. But it is clear that they' would have pushed the estimated variance up
even further. Many of the worst performers compared to expectation are African and
^"^Since o*; = where ohs is tlu^ imiulx'r of observations and z is the number of right hand side
variables, it is clear that the estiniatc Ix'conics unstai)i(' when both the numerator and denomuiator
approach zero as 2 ^ obs. • ' ' ' '
-®The low expected Canadian growth is to a {rr(?at extent the result of the highest fertility rate in the
OECD. As discussed above, the fertility rate is closely associated with many important macroeconomic
variables. Canada was expected to perform significantly below average based on a wide range ofsuch
indicators. Compared to the OECD average, in 1955, it had a higher per capita GDP, lower growth
in the past one and five years, a higher population growth rate, a higher consumption rate and lower
enrollment in secondary and higher education.
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South American countries.
4.2 Welfare Gains
For the same information sets as in Figures 1 and 2, Figures 4 and 5 show the welfare
gain for a representative country as a function of the horizon. Since the gain is based on
a weighted average of the variance of residual risk at various horizons, the welfare gain
curves are smoother than those for the standard deviations. At a 10, 20 and 35 year
horizon welfare gains for these and other information sets axe also reported in Table 3.
Using the base information set, at a 35 year horizon the welfare gain is an enormous
6.61% for the 49 countries and a still very large 1.52% for OECD countries. In present
discounted value terms this amounts to an increase in resources that is 221% of current
output for the 49 countries, and 51% of current output for the OECD countries. These
gains are also large when comparing this to the size of the US securities industry, which
averaged to only 0.6% of GDP in the 1980s. So the potential costs of risksharing
must be far below potential benefits.
For the 49 countries the gains are large even for very short horizons, 2.25% for a 10
year horizon. The gain of 0.45% for OECD countries at a 10 year horizon is relatively
small though. At horizons longer than 35 years the welfare gain is of course even larger.
It is hard to know how long the horizon of a, representative investor might be. In
theory it could even be infinite if generations are always connected through operative
intergenerational transfers. A conservative estimate for longer horizons can be obtained
by assuming that the standard deviation of residual risk does not rise further beyond
a 35 year horizon. For a 50 year horizon the welfare gain is then 9.55% and 2.27% for
the two sets of countries. For a 100 year horizon these numbers are 13.26% and 3.15%."
It is hard to ignore the enormous size of these potential welfare benefits. It certainly
does not rationalize the lack of risksharing observed in the data.
If we raise or lower the riskfree rate by 1% annually the results do not change dra
matically. For example, for the set of 49 countries the welfare gain at the 35 year horizon
drops from 6.61% to 6.24% when Ar, = 0.01/. and rises to 6.98% when An = -O.Olt.
^®Seo vail Wincoop [1994], pp. 187.
-'While our method doe's not rely on an assinncd underlying data generating process, it is worth
noting that gains of this magnitude for OECD countries are somewhere in between those reported in
van Wincoop [1996b] for a random walk process and an AR in growth rates. There the same rate of
relative risk aversion was assumed, while the risk-adjusted growth rate and riskfree interest rate are of
similar magnitude as in this paper.
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From Figures 4 and 5 we see that for most horizons the welfare gain based on the
three best variables is very similar to that based on all 13 variables. This is an important
finding, which is obviously closely related to.that for the standard deviations in Figures
1 and 2, It shows that once .the three most important variables are included in the
information.set, the welfare gain results are robust to adding'additional variables. This
stands in sharp contrast to computing welfare' gains based on endowment processes,
where results are very sensitive to changes in the type of process- and small' parameter
changes of a given process. ' " • '
Table 3 reports results-from adding some additional vmables •beyond the base "in
formation set. In row 7 we add the average investment rate over-the past-five years,
which is less sensitive to the up and downs of a particular year. It has practically no
effect on the results. In row 8 we add the percentage of primary, secondary and higher
school-attained..These can be considered stock variables, as opposed to the enrollment
variables, which represent flows.. Again, adding these variables does not significantly
affect on the results. Finally,-we add the lagged consumption growth rates over the past
one and five years. Since consumption should be based on forward looking behaviour;
these might be important. But again there are no notable effects on the welfare gain
measure. . .
Based on the shorter, period 1970-:1990, without interpolated data, we also consider
adding political instability (number of revolutions and assasinations) and terms of trade
growth, both over the. past five years. These variables also have very little effect on
the estimated welfare gain. For the 49 countries, the three 'best variables' (leading to
the lowest -welfare" gain over a twenty, year horizon) are now initial GDP, the fertility
rate .and the terms of trade growth. The latter replaces the investment rate.. For that
information set the welfare gain is 3.72% over a 20 year horizon. However, the welfare
gain is an almost identical 3.75% when-the information set consists of the 'old top three'
(initial,GDP, fertility rate and investment rate).: When terms of trade growth is added
to 'the old top three', the welfare gain drops negligibly to' 3.62%.''Terms of trade growth
has significant predictive power for short horizons, but is'insignificant for' the twenty
year horizon. Since long term,growth uncertainty'is the primary source: of welfare-,
gains, it is likely that the terms of trade plays even less of"a role at horizons longer than
^^Eaatcrly, et al. [1993], Fisher [1993] and Mcndoza [1994] all find that'terms of trade growth has
significant predictive power, but they don't inchule the investment rate in their growth regressions.
This is consistent with our finding's. Fisher |1993] and Mendoza [1994] also find that the terms oftrade
is a much better predictor at short than long horizons.
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20 years.
Evans andKarras [1996] suggest that the parameters ofa given output process may be
different across countries and that this could significantly affect convergence estimates.
We have assumed that the vector A^, which measures the impact of the variables in the
information set on growth expectations, is equal across countries. For long horizons we
axe unable to estimate Xg separately for each country since we have only one observation
per country. However, differences across countries are related to more fundamental
economic differences that should be captured in the information set itself. In order to
allow for differences across countries in the relationship between specific variables and
growth expectations, we experiment with adding to the regressions various interaction
terms involving the three best variables. Ourwelfare measure is not significantly affected
however.
We also experiment with different functional forms, adding the log of initial endow
ment squared, or using the log of fertility and investment rates instead of the levels.
These experiments also don't have a substantial effect on the welfare gain results.
So far we have ignored potential measurement,error inour data. DeLong [1988] shows
that the convergence parameter can be significantly affectedwhen there is measurement
error in initial income. Measurement error is likely to be more severe for data in 1955
than in 1990. We ask ourselves what happens to the estimate of 0-35 when we add
additional measurement error to the log of 1955 per capita output of each country. This
leads to additional random variaton of 1955 per capita output around the true level.
Assuming that, this error has a standard deviation of 0.05, a 95 % confidence interval
of the additional random variation is 20% of measured per capita GDP (2 standard
deviations up and. down), which is quite significant. We compute 0-35 500 times, each
time using different randomly perturbed 1955 output data. When the information set
consists of the best three variables, the average (T35 we obtain is 34.77% for the 49
countries. This is only shghtly larger than the standard deviation of 34.59% of residual
risk based on measured 1955 GDP data. A similar result applies to OECD countries.
So long term growth uncertainty, which matters most for the welfare gain measure, is
not affected significantly by introducing a reasonable degree of measurement error.
we add to the three best variables all possible interaction terms, the welfare gaiix for the 49
countries, baaed on a 35 year horizon, drops only sliglitly from 7.35% to 7.27%.
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4.3,. Alternative Endowment Measures ;
Table 4 reports welfare gains for two alternative endowment measures, corresponding to
two potential problenis associated with per capita GDP. The first is best illustrated by
writing per capita GDP ^ pf *e, where pr is productivity per worker and e is per capita
effort. Effort is defined as total ho^iirs worked. To some extent individual effort is not
really a control variable'for that individual. Examples are involuntary unemployment,
or national customs with respect to female participation in the labor force, the work
week and vacation time. If'effort were compietdy determined by national factors, not
under the control of individual agents;' and we also ignore the utility cost of effort, the
correct endowment measure for this paper is per capita GDP. At "the other extreme, one
may consider effort to be entirely an individual specific choice variable. In that case it
is optimal to engage in risksharing with respect to national productivity pr. which is
then the correct endowment measure. In Table 5 we consider GDP per worker as an
alternative endowment ine^ure. While it wo'iid 'be even better to have .data on GDP
per hour worked, data on hours per week are often not available.
A second problem with per capita GDP as an endowment measure is that it includes
both investment and consumption goods. As an alternative we therefore consider per
capita private consumption. The issue of investment brings up two questions, one as
sociated with the distinction between production and endowment economies, another
with moral hazard. Most of the literature on welfare gains from international riskshar
ing considers endowment economies, as does this paper. This ignores potential gains
that are specific to actual production economies. It is possible that there are additional
gains from trade in risky productive technologies if it leads to a gradual shift over time
towards capital in relatively low risks, or high expected return, countries. We-focus
exclusively on the risksharing role of ^set trade', even though this is hard to separate
from the resource allocation role in actual production economies.
^^Individual effort should be broadly interpreted. We implicitly assume that all individuals have
access to the same production function' with productivity jrr. if one individual is less productive than
another, it is attributed to less 'effort'.
'^Obstfeld [1994a) considers a world with trade in risky capital, whereby he-makes.the-extreme'
assumption that these productive assets are in infinite supply. This leads to enormous welfare gains,
ranging' from 22.6% for East Asia to 478.4% for non-East Asia, since agents can-shift their resources to
the highest expected return, lowest risk assets. While the assumption that these assets are in infinite
supply is rather extreme, it does illustrate a potentially significant additional benefit associated with
optimal resource allocation.' ' ' " '
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The potential moral hazard problem associated with investment is easily illustrated
with the Japanese example. If the OECD countries had engaged in perfect risksharing
during our sample, Japan would have had to make significant transfers to the rest
of the world because of its unexpected high growth. One might, argue that this is
unreasonable because they have themselves borne the costs of this growth through high
investment in machinary, equipment, infrastructure, and human capital. This appears,
to be a moral hazard problem since it would not be optimal for Japan to have made this
investment if it were engaged in perfect risksharing. It is important to realize however
that for one individual there is no moral hazard problem associated with investment in
either physical or human capital since the individual does not control the behaviour of,
others. Moral hazard does arise at the government level to the extent that government
policy affects long term growth. However, Shiller [1993] argues that governmental moral
hazard is present even in existing financial markets and has not prevented them from
functioning. Governments have a strong incentive to cooperate after risksharing
in order to stimulate growth at a global level, and can impose heavy penalties on a
government that cheats.
Table 4 reports the results for all three endowment measures. For the set of 49
countries the welfare gain based on the 35 year horizon drops a bit from 6.61% to
5.81% when output per worker is used as the endowment. But it rises to 7.26% when
the endowment is per capita consumption. This is based on all 13 variables, but a
similar result applies to the three best variables (1, 6, and 12) and also to shorter
horizons. For OECD countries, using GDP per worker as the endowment instead of
per capita GDP has practically no effect on the welfare gain measure for the 10 and
20 year horizons. However, using all 13 variables the welfare gain drops from 1.52% to
1.02% for the 35 year horizon. This result is unreliable though due to the few remaining
degrees of freedom. For the three best variables (1, 11, 12) the welfare gain drops only
slightly from 1.47% to 1.35%. For this same information set, replacing GDPwith private
consumption as the endowment measure leads to a slightly higher welfare gains at the 10
year horizon, but somewhat lower at the 35 year horizon. Overall we can conclude that
the benchmark endowment measure (per capita GDP) does not provide a significantly
biased (either upward or downward) estimate of welfare gains in comparison with the
^^Shiller also notes that govemniciits can be monitored better than individuals and that explicit
contract provisions can rule out settlement based on obvious negative policies. Government policy can
of course significantly affect both aggregate and private consumption. For moral hazard reasons trade
in claims on GDP might therefore be more easily achievable than trade in a consumption based asset.
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alternative, endowment measures. The fact that welfare gains are'riot systematically
lower when using consumption data also indicates that the degree of risksharing already
achieved is very limited.
4.4 Historical Data
• T ,
We now apply the methodology to historical data from 1870 to ,1990. ' This allows
us to compute welfare gains over longer horizons, but h£^ the disadvantage that the
information set is limited to a much smaller set of variables for which historical data
are available. We include both initial GDP and the fertihty rate in the li^ormation set.
The results for post war data indicate that most of the explanatory power comes from
these two variables. We also experiment with including lagged growth rates of GDP and
' ' . j ' • ' ' ' ' ' •
population in the information set.
)• • '' ' '
GDP and population data are, from Maddispn [1995]. Fertility rates come from
various sources, listed in Appendix D, and are available for 24 countries. GDP data,
are not available for every year. We only use years for which data are available fon alL
countries in the sample. For all 24 countries GDP data are available in 1870, 1900, 1913,
1929, 1938, and 1947-:1990. For smaller sets of countries it is available for more years.
Table 5 reports the countries and their per capita GDP (in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars)
at different points in time.
One has to be careful in choosing the set of countries to be included in the sample.
DeLong [1988] criticized Baumol's [1986]. cross sectional growth regressions as being
biased towards convergence since the sample includes only countries that haVe ex-post
converged. Instead, DeLong 1988 chooses a set of 22 countries based ;on a relatively
high initial (rather than ex-post) income. We will consider various sets of countries,
dependent on the cutoff for 1870 GDP. This ranges from the richest eight in 1870 to the
^^The fertility.rate is defined fLs tlu; crude l)irtli rato. Tlic fertility rate, from the Barro Lee dataset
that we used for the post-war data is dofiiied as the cxpccted number of babies during .the hfetime of
a woman, which is based on currcnt information on tlic nunil)cr ofbabies women have at various ages.
However, we find that for the post-war period tlic avora«(e time series correlation between these two
series (over 49 countries) is 0.997;'and the 19G0 (tos.s section'correlation is 0.9898. -We therefore find"
that our welfare gain results for the post-war period remain substantially unaltered' when we use the
crude birth rate as the definition of tlie fertility rate.
in Geary-Khamis dollars refers to a purcriiasing power parity based GDP measure, using
international averagepricesof commodities, just as in the PennWorld Tables. There is a nicediscussion
of the Geary-Khamis approach in Maddispn.[1995],.pp. 162-165.
^^All countries with 1870 GDP above 300 1975 dollars are included.
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entire set of all 24 countries. Baumol, Blackman and Wolff [1989] show that the cutoff
point is important for convergence. They consider the top'8 through the top 14 based
on 1870 GDP and find stronger convergence among the richest countries.
Figure 6 shows the welfare gain for a 120 year horizon as a function of the number
of countries in the sample, including successively poorer countries based on 1870 GDP.
For the richest eight the welfare gain is 4.88%. Only after inluding the 17th country,
Argentina, does the gain rise significantly to 7.75%. Argentina's performance has been
far below average during the sample. The other break occurs after including the last
country, India. The welfare gain then rises from 9.3% to 16.5%. As shown in Table 5,
India's per capita GDP only slightly more than doubled from 1870 to 1990, while for
the average country it increased by a factor of 9.
These gains are very substantial, even for the smallest set of rich countries. For
the richest 8 countries in 1870, growth performance has varied widely. As shown in
Table 5, Australia was 75% richer than Switzerland in 1870, but was 32% poorer than
Switzerland in 1990. Similarly, New Zealand was 27% richer than the US in 1870, but
was 56% poorer than the US in 1990. Within Europe, the UK was 71% richer than
Germany in 1870, but was 15% poorer than Germany in 1990. While these different
growth rates were to a limited extent predictable in 1870, the potential welfare gain of
4.88% shows that there is substantial residual risk. We beheve that this is indicative of
the current OECD countries. Up to the 35 year horizon the estimated standard deviation
of residual risk is about the same as that reported for the 21 OECD countries in section
4.2. After that it rises somewhat more, from 0.15 at the 35 year horizon to 0.20 at the
120 year horizon. The welfare gain of 17% for the set of 24 countries is indicative of
the gain from risksharing among a broad set of countries. For the 35 year horizon the
estimated standard deviation of residual risk is 0.30, similar to that for the set of 49
countries based on post war data. It then rises to 0.40 at the 120 year horizon.
Adding lagged growth rates of per capita GDP and population to the information
set has little effect on the results. For a set of 22 countries the welfare gain for a 90
year horizon is 13.54% when the information set consists of the fertility rate and initial
per capita GDP, and drops only marginally to 12.96% when 20 year lagged endowment
and population growth are added. We find that the welfare gain estimate even rises a
bit when 10 or 30 year lagged growth rates are included in the information set.
Since prewar output measurement error is potentially severe, we perform a similar
take out Switzerland and Hungary, for which data in 1890 are not available
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measurement error experiment as at the end of section 4.2. This time we consider what
happens when we introduce an additional random disturbance to the log of 1870 per
capita GDP with a standard error of 15%. This means that the 95 % confidence interval
of the additional random variation is an enormous 60% of measured 1870 per capita
GDP. Nonetheless we find that our average <7120 for the 24 countries, based on 500
different draws of perturbed 1870 per capita GDP in each country, is 41.50%, which is
only a little bit higher than the estimate of 40.15% based on measiu-ed data. So it is
unlikely that our welfare gain measure is significantly affected by pre-war measurement
error in GDP.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a new methodologj' for measuring potential welfare gains from inter
national risksharing. one that is closely connected with the empirical growth Bterature.
In contrast to the latter, we have focused on growth uncertainty rather than factors
that might explain growth ex-post. Thus, our regressions are not subject to the stan
dard causality problems of the empirical growth literature. Our results axe robust to the
size of the information set in that adding additional variables beyond the two or three
most important ones (initial GDP, fertility rate and investment) does not change the
welfare measure substantially. In contrast, previous work on international risksharing
has relied on specific assumptions about the endowment process and found the results
to be extremely sensitive to the particular process assumed. Here we have taken a much
more direct route in measuring what ultimatelymatters for risksharing, the variance of
residual risk at various horizons.
Lsing a variety of sources for both post-war and historical data, we conclude that
potential welfare gains from global risksharing are very large. For a 35 year horizon, using
post war data, the gain corresponds to an equivalent permanent increase in consumptiori
of6.6% when based on a set of 49countries, and 1.5% whenbased on 21 OECD countries.
Using historical data from 1870 to 1990. we find that the potential gain for a 120 year
horizon ranges from 4.9% for a small set of rich countries to 16.5% for a broad set of 24
countries.
There are three important directions for future research. One question that we have
not addressed in this paper is how large potential gains from risksharing are among
regions within a country. Since macro markets do not currently exist even within nations.
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there might be a significant potential to share risk for example among the US states.
A second and closely related question that needs to be addressed is whether one really
needs macro markets (claims on GDP) in order to achieve risksharing. If for example
the retm-n of claims on corporate dividends (stock) is highly correlated with the return
of 'claims on GDP over long periods of time, most of the potential welfare gains can
be achieved through the existing stock markets. Finally, even though the focus of this
paper is on.risksharing, the methodology can also be applied to compute potential gains
from consumption smoothing through intertemporal asset trade (a riskfree bond). To
that end all we need to know is the expected deviation from world consumption growth
at different horizons. This is a byproduct of our analysis.
^^van Wincoop [1995] shows that for Japanese prefectures cross region consumption correlations are
just as low as cross country consumption correlations and explains this in a model where asset trade
among regions,is limited to riskfree bonds and equity (no macro markets).
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Appendix A •
We will prove that the. price of a claim on rep's-per capita endowment.stream relative.to
the price of a claim on the world per capita endowment stream is l.when (i) Eq yrep,t =
Eq (ii) ^ ~ To do this, all we need to show is
that for any.horizon t the relative price of 'a claim on rep's per capita endowment stream
is one. There are na claims on the country ^ per capita endowment in period t, each with
a payoff of yu and a price ofpi. Consider an inyestor in any country, who at .time .0 invests•
a total of Yi in period t claims Yt is the-investor's-peridd 0 revenue from selling all
claims on its own endowment). The investor maximizes (Z)£i
= Yt. Here qi is.the quantity of country i equity purchased. The first order
conditions with respect to the'^i's are: . .
Er
/ N ' \-T
S liVit Vjt— i^Pj j '=1,N
\t=l
The price of a claim on the per capita world endowment is Eili Using the first
order conditions, and the fact that in equilibrium =5?^— = the relative price ofa
claim on rep's per capita endowment is: ' ' '
' . ' ' -i I ' • • • 1 . k,'^ ' >1
•Prep _.i^0 jy^) '^ yrep,t
XliPinit/m .Eoiy^r^ : -
yrep,t has a log-normal distribution,' and so does the per capita endowment for every other
country While the distribution of is not exactly log-normal; Appendix 3 shows that
it is very close to a log-normal distribution of-the'form yf = (Eq Using
this approximation aijd yrep,t = Substituting these exv
pressions for y^ and yrep,t into to form\ila for the relative -price, dt follows immediately
from the assumptions (i) and (ii) that the relative price is one..
Appendix B Numerical approximation in eqn, (7)
In order to show that the numerical approximation in (7) is very |Close we draw e =
(^1.0,*!0,0'from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance S.' We don't
have any direct measure of e, as the analysis focuses on the uncertainty about the devia
tion from world growth, captured by the u's. We know that var{€rep,o,t) = var{urep,o,t) +
In order to allow for large imcertainty about global shocks, for this exercise
we.assume var{€^,) = var{urep,o,t), so th3,i var{erep,Q,t) = 2i;ar(^^,p.o.().;We moreover
assume that T;ar(ei,o,() is the same for all countries, which appears on the diagonal of
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S. We consider both a set of 21 countries with var{urep.o,t) —0.35^ (the upper bound
for OECD countries at the 35 year horizon-see Figure 2) and a set of 49 countries with
var{Urep,o^t) = 0.45^ (upper bound 35 year horizon Figure 1). In order to introduce as
much risk as possible these numbers are based on the case of empty information sets,
which lead to the largest possible estimates of var{urep,o,t)- The weights are set
based on 1990 GDP shares. We assume the same correlation of the Cj.o.f s across sets of
countries. This correlation is set such that O'T.6 = var{€^f) = var(urep,o.t)-
We take 100,000 draws of e from the A'^ (0, E) distribution in order to compute
al = Eo [E£i Si,o,t and a2 = Eo We set
7 = 3. For the 49 countries these numbers are al = 1.83655 and a2 = 1.83605. More
meaningful is the corresponding certainty equivalent of /Eoy^' = The ap
proximation used in the paper is = 0.7379, which is very close to the true
value = 0.7380. For the OECD countries we have = 0.8314 and
q11/{i-7) == 0.8318. These differences are even smaller for more realistic lower values of
i;ar(eo|^ ) and for shorter horizons.
Appendix C Countries post war period
49 Countries: Kenya. Mauritius. Uganda, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala. Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad k Tobago,
U.S.. Argentina. Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia. Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela. India. Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland. France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor
way. Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, U. K., Australia, New Zealand.
21 OECD Countries: Canada. U.S.. Japan. Austria. Belgium,Denmark, Finland, France.
Germany. Greece. Ireland. Italy, Netherlands. Norway. Portugal. Spain. Sweden. Turkey,
U.K.. Australia. New Zealand.
Appendix D Fertility Data Historical Sample
We use a wide variety of sources to construct an historical sample of fertility rates, from
1870 to 1990, for 24 countries. Most of the sources come from EasterHn [1996]. Some
times. such as for the US, yearly observations going back to 1870 are available. Other
times the data are only available at 5 or 10 year intervals. In that case we interpolate
between the observations. Often pre-war fertility rat^ are reported as averages over 5
or ten year inter\'als. Since these rates are quite smooth over time, we then assume that
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the fertiUty rate is the same for all years in the interval. For some countries the first
observation is somewhat after 1870. In that case we extrapolate the earliest observations
back to 1870. The sources'we use are: . ' '
All countries, 1951-1990: United Nations, 1993, World Population Prospects.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland; FVance', Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor
way, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kirigdonii'1861-1950: Glass,'D.V. and
E. Grebenik, 1965, World Population, 1800-1950,. in H.J., Habakkuk. and. M. Postan
(eds.), the Cambridge Economic History of Europe: Volume IVi, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
' ' . . - 'j '
Argentina, 1870-1949: Collver, A.O., 1965, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Esti
mates of historical Trends and Fluctuations, University of CaUfornia, Berkeley.
Australia, 1881-19,47: Chandrasekhar, S., 1967, Asia's Population Problems with a Dis
cussion of Population and Immigration in Australia, Frederick A. Praeger Pubhshers. •
Canada, 1866-1950: Statistics Canada, 1993, Selected Birth and Fertihty Statistics,
Canada, Although the data before 1921 are,unpublished, we obtained, them directly
from the Research Department. ^
Gerrnany, 1861-1939: Knodel, J.E., 1974, The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871-
' 1 . 1' ' j '
1939. Princeton University Press.
India and Pakistaji, 1881-1941: Coale, A.J. and E.M. Hoover, 1958, Population Growth
and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries, Princeton University Press.
Japan, 1875-1925: Mosk, C., 1983, Patriarchy and Fertility: Japan and Sweden, 1880-
1960, Academic Press.
NewZealand, 1888-1938: New Zealand Five Million Club, Birth Rate Committee, 1939,
After the First 100 Years; Causes and Consequesces of a Declining Population.
Portugal, 1871-1950: Bacci, M.L.. 1971. A Century of Portuguese Fertility, Princeton
University Press. .
United States, 1870-1949: Coale. A.J. and M. Zelnik. 1963, New Estimates of Fertility
and Population in the United States. Princeton University Press.
USSR, 1926-1940: Lewis, R.A., R.H. Rowland and R.S. Clem, 1976, Nationality and
PopulationChange in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970,
Praeger Publishers; 1870-1914: PisareV, I., 1962, The Population of the U.S.S.R.: A
Socio-Economic Survey, Progress Publishers.
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L Regressions using the entire 'base information set'
1 year Horizon 10 year Horizon 35 year Horizon
—0.06; a\ = 0.048 ' R^ = 0.33; aio = 0.168 ^2 = 0.50; a35 = 0.330
RHS variables:
1. 2/ —initial -0.0178 (0.0038) -0.206 (0.048) -0.661 (0.170)
2. Aiy 0.1391 (0.0268) -1.581 (0.349) -1.574 (1.761)
3. Asy -0.0274 (0.0120) . 0.544 (0.162) 0.282 (0.559)
4. GPO -0.0759 (0.0449) -1.052 (0.522) -2.085 (2.157)
5. C/Y -0.0193 (0.0228) -0.271 (0.265) -0.658 (0.969)
6. I/Y 0.0006 (0.0003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.011)
7. G/Y -0.0009 (0.0003) -0.009 (0.004) -0.027 (0.018)
8. (JC + M}/y 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.000 (0.001) -0.004 (0.003)
9. PRIE -0.0060 (0.0122) 0.029 (0.143) 0.294 (0.427)
10. SECE 0.0034 (0.0107) -0.020 (0.134) 0.872 (0.444)
11. HIGHE 0.0093 (0.0161) 0.147 (0.210) -0.764 (1.729)
12. FERT -0.0035 (0.0022) -0.035 (0.027) 0.023 (0.098)
13. LIFE 0.0006 (0.0004) 0.009 (0.005) 0.040 (0.019)
I. Regressions based on three 'best' variables
1 year Horizon 10 year Horizon 35 year Horizon
oo
o
o
II
<b
o
o
11
= 0.23; ^10 = 0.180 R^ = 0.45; a35 = 0.346
RHS variables:
1. y —initial -0.0124 (0.0024) -0.132 (0.031) -0.286 (0.084)
2. IJY 0.0008 (0.0002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.012 (0.007)-
3. FERT -0.0067 (0.0012) -0.083 (0.015) -0.184 (0.033)
Table 1: Some regression results for the set of 49 countries
Ao/es : The table reports point estimates (with standard error in brackets) of panel regressions ofequation
4 for 49 countries from 1955 to 1990. The one year horizon regression uses all one year growth rates over
this period. The 10year horizon regression uses growth rates from 1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980 and 1980 to
1990. For the 35year horizon only growth rates from 1955 to 1990 are used. Results are reported both for
the 'base information set' of 13 variables and for a smaller information set of three variables that generate
the lowest welfare gain at the 35year horizon (and therefore have most explanatory power). The table also
reports the R' and the estimated standard deviation of the innovation from the regiession at each horizon.
I. Regressions using the entire 'base information set'
1 year Horizon 10 year Horizon 35 year Horizon
R^ = 0.19; <71 = 0.025 R^ = 0;64; aio = 0.071 R^ = 0.75; 1735 = 0.164
RHS variables:
1. 2/ —initial -0.0369 (0.0051) • -0.355, (0.049) -0.557 (0.221)
2. Aiy 0.18.80 (0.0398) •-p.206 (0.440) 0.671 (2.756)
3. Asy -0.0145 (0.0171) , , 0.183 (0.172) 0.099 ,(1.405)
4. GPO -0.0052 (0.0426) . 0.473.(0.426) 1.605 (1.733)
5. C/Y -0.1653 (0.0364) . ,-0.784 (0.393) . -1.822 (2.569)
6. j/y -0.0017 (0.0004) -0.004 (0.004) t0.01-2 (0.022)
7. G/Y -0.0017 (0.0005) , , -0.003 (0.005) -0.005 (0.029)
8. {X + M)/Y 0.0000 (0.0000) , \ q.ooo (0.000) O.OOl (0.003)
9. PRIE 0.0007 (0.0244)
i
0.256,(0.265) 1.176 (0.776)
10. SECE 0.0213 (0.0080) 0.115.(0.078). 0.009 (0.333)
11. HIGHE • 0.0081 (0.0151) "
"
0.386 (0.158) 0.759 (L459.)
12. FERT -0.0080 (0.0023) -0.079 (0,025) -0.127 (0.141)
13. LIFE 0.0008 (0.0005) 0.005 (0.005) j » ^0,015 (0.032)
I. Regressions based on three 'best' variables -
1 year Horizon 10 yeai' Horizon 35 year Horizon
^2^0.14; ai = 0.026 R^ = 0.61; (710 = 0.074 ^2 = 0.80; a35 = 0.143
RHS variables:
.
1. y —initial -0.0257 (0.0031) • -0.261 (0.031) -0.561 (0.082)^
2. HIGHE 0.0208 (0.0105) 0.293 (0.102) 1.577 (0.627)
3. FERT -0.0109 (0.0014) • - -0.096 (0.014) -0.151 (0.032)
Table 2: Some regiession results for the set of 21 OECD countries
Notes : The table reports point estimates (with standard error in brackets) of panel regressions of equation '
4 for 21 OECD countries from 1955 to 1990. The oneyear horizon regiession uses all oneyear growth rates
over this period. The 10 year horizon regression uses growth rates from 1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980and 1980
to 1990. For the 35year horizononly growth rates from 1955 to 1990 are used. Results are reported both for
the 'base information set' of 13 variables and for a smaller information set of three variables that generate
the lowest welfare gain at the 35 year horizon (and theiefore have most explanatory power). The tablealso
reports the R" and the estimated standard deviation of the innovation from the regression at each horizon.
Variables:
Inform. Set:
(variables)
49 countries
Horizon (years):
10 20 35
OECD countries
Horizon (years):
10 20 35
1. 1-13 2.25 4.26 6.61 0.45 0.73 1.52
2. none 2.93 6.56 13.84 1.00 2.04 5.06
3. 1 2.83 6.20 12.60 0.76 1.39 2.74
4. 1,12 2.40 4.45 8.13 0.54 0.94 1.72
5.-1,6,12 2.37 4.26 7.35 0.54 0.94 1.77
6. 1,11,12 2.41 4.48 8.22 0.52 0.88 1.47
7. M4 2.26 4.16 6.50 0.46 0.71 1.54
8. 1-13,15-17 2.19 4.16 6.35 0.47 0.78 1.54
9. 1-13,18,19 2.24 4.28 6.46 0.47 0.72 1.44
1. 1-13 '
2. 1-13,20
3. 1-13,21
2.24 3.71
2.16 3.65
1.99 3.56
0.34 0.64
0.34 0.66
0.35 0.66
Table 3: Welfare Gain (%)
1. y-initial 6. IjY 11. HIGHE 16. SECA 21. TOT
2..Aiy l.GJY 12. PERT 11. HIGHA
3. Asy 8. {X + M)IY 13. LIFE 18. Ajc
4. GPO 9. PRIE 14. //y(5yr.av.) 19. A5C
5. C/Y 10. SECE 15. PRIA 20. PINSTAB
i\otes : The table reports welfare gains for a representative country for horizons of 10,
20 and 35 years. The endowment measure is real GDP per capita. The rate of relative
risk-aversion is 3. The information set used to estimate the variance of residual risk is
listed in the first column. The results are based on annual data from 1955 to 1990.
tInform, Set:
(variables)
49 countries
Horizon (years):
10 20 35
1OECD countries
Horizon (years):
10 20 35
Endowment=GDP' per capita
1. 1-13
2. 1,6,12
3. 1,11,12
2.25 . 4.26 6.61
2.37 4.26 7.35
2.41 4.48 8.22
.0.45 0.73 1.52
0.54 ,0.94 1.77
0.52 0.88 1.47
Endowment=GDP per worker
1. 1-13
2. 1,6,12
3. 1,11,12
2.27 3.92 5.81
2.44 4.15 6.59.
2.50, 4.37 7.32
,0.50 0.73 ,1.02
0.55 0.93 1.50
0.56 0.91 1.35
Endowment=consumptipn per capita
1. 1-13
2. 1,6,12
3. 1,11,12
2.49 4.73 7.26
2.63 4.78 8.18
2.70 5.01 8.95
0.59 0.73 1.25
0.70 1.14 2.30
0.63 0.92 1.33
Table 4: Welfare Gain for alternative endowment measures
Notes : The table reports welfare gains for a representative country for,horizons of10. 20
and 35years for three different endowment measures. The variables in the information set
correspond to those listed in Table 3. The rate of relative risk-aversion is 3. The results
are based on annual data from 1955 to 1990.
Per Capita GDP (1990 Geary Khamis dollars) GDP Ratio Growth Rate
Countries 1870 1900 1950 1990 1990 to 1870 in percent
1. Argentina 1311 2756 4987 6581 5.02 1.35
2. Australia 3801 4299 7218 16417 4.32 1.23
3. Austria 1875 2901 3731 16792 8.96 1.84
4. Belgium 2640 3652 5346 16807 6.37 1.55
5. Canada 1620 2758 7047 19599 12.10 2.10
6. Denmark 1927 2902 6683 17953 9.32 1.88
7. Finland 1107 1620 4131 16604 15.00 2.28
8. France 1858 2849 5221 17777 9.57 1.90
9. Germany 1913 3134 4281 18685 9.77' 1.92
10. Hungary 1269 1682 2480 6348 5.00 1.35
11. India 558 625 597 1316 2.36 0.72
12. Ireland 1773 2495 3518 11123 6.27 1.54
13. Italy 1467 1746 3425 15951 10.87 2.01
14. Japan 741 1135 1873 18548 '25.03 2.72-
15. Netherlands 2640 3533 5850 16569 6.28 1.54
16. New Zealand 3115 4320 8495 13994 4.49 1.26
17. Norway 1303 1762 4969 16897 12.97 2.16
18. Portugal 1085 1408 2132 10685 9.85 1.92
19. Spain 1376 2040 2397 12170 8.84 1.83 •'
20. Sweden 1664 2561 6738 17695 10.63 1.99
21. Switzerland 2172 3531 8939 21661 9.97 1.94
22. UK 3263 4593 6847 16302 5.00 1.35
23. USA 2457 4096 9573 21866 8.90 1.84
24. USSR 1023 1218 2834 6871 6.72 1.60
Table 5: Countries in the historical data set
Notes : This table shows per capita GDP in 1990Geaiy-Khamis dollars (international prices) for 24 countries
over selected years. The last column reports the annualized growth rate over the period 1870 to 1990.
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